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For many years now live been doing the kind of writing that in the US
is called theory-feminist theory, film theory, gender theory, psychoanalytic
theory, and so on. More recently live been interested in questions of sexuality
and its representation in film and literature, in critical texts or works of
theory, and what I call public fantasies. My last book, published last year with
the title The Practice of Love, is concerned with sexuality and the theory of
fantasy; in this area psychoanalysis is of course fundamental, and especially
Freud, whose work live been reading for some 25 years and find more and
more complex, rich, ambiguous, and fascinating as time goes by. What I
propose in the book is, in effect, a theory of desire, which I call perverse
desire; I develop it through a somewhat eccentric reading of Freud and
through the analysis of lesbian and feminist texts. The book is being
translated into German and will be published next year, so I will tell you
something about it, by way of a preview.
But first [1] I want to say how it is that, for a book about a theory of
desire, live chosen the title The Practice of Love. Then [2] I will reflect more
generally on the relations of theory and practice, or perhaps it is better to say
theories and practices-of sexuality, of psychoanalysis, and of textual analysis.
I will suggest that, in all these cases, [3] a theory is a passionate fiction, not a
hypothesis to be proven or disproven, and not a statement of the true order of
things; rather, a theory is a contingent, if historically and culturally grounded
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fiction, and an intersubjective fiction-what Freud called a construction in
analysis ["Konstruktionen in der Analyse" (1937)]; and therefore a theory is
also inseparable from a practice of reading and a practice of writing.
1. Why do I call my book The Practice of Love when I say that it is a theory of
desire? In answering this question, I will have to say something about
sexuality and fantasy.
Those of you who know the cinema may recognize in my title that of a
film by Valie Export, Die Praxis der Liebe (1984). That title phrase haunted me
ever since I saw the film-the title more than the film-and thus the words
"the practice of love" not only preceded but in a sense overdetermined my
thinking about lesbian sexuality and desire. So I asked Valie Export's
permission to use her title, and she very graciously gave it.
My Practice of Love is an eccentric reading of Freud, through the work
of Jean Laplanche and the Lacanian and feminist revisions, in conjunction
with lesbian literary and filmic texts. My project was to reread Freudian
psychoanalysis in order to rethink lesbian sexuality both within and against
its epistemological and conceptual framework. For, unlike a great number of
feminist critics, who reject Freud as the enemy of women, I think that his
theory, or his passionate fiction, in spite of its heterosexual presumption, is
singularly important for understanding or thinking sexuality in a different
way. To that end, I analized two major strands of the psychoanalytic
discourse on female homosexuality: first, the classic studies of Freud, Jeanne
Lampl-de Groot, Helene Deutsch, and Ernest Jones in the 1920s and 30s; and
second, the recent development (since the late 1970s) of a feminist theory of
female sexuality that returns to Freud via Lacan. I read these psychoanalytic
texts on female homosexuality in conjunction with lesbian literary and filmic
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texts: the classic novel of female inversion, Radclyffe Hall's The WeIl 0/
Loneliness (published and banned in England in 1928) and several works of
poetry, film, drama of the 1980s by Adrienne Rich, Cherrie Moraga, Sheila
McLaughlin, and others. I should say right away that my interest in
psychoanalysis is not therapeutic but theoretical and epistemological: what
drives my project is the desire to tamper with the present conditions of
knowledge. But why, again, if my project is a theory of desire, do I call the
book The Practice 0/ Love?
Lesbianism is both a sexual practice and a particular structuration of
desire. Since the fantasies that ground it and the signs that signify or
represent it may differ both culturally and individually, perhaps the single
defining condition of lesbian sexuality and desire is that their subject and
their object are both female-embodied. Gf course, various other affective or
social ties may be involved in a lesbian relationship-ties that mayaiso exist
in other relations between and among women, from friendship to rivalry,
political sisterhood to class or racial antagonism, ambivalence to love, and so
on. But the term lesbian refers specifically to a sexual relation, for better or for
worse, and however broadly one may wish to define sexual. I use this term
(sexual) to include centrally, beyond any performed or fantasized physical
sexual act, whatever it may be, the conscious presence of desire in one woman
for another. It is that desire, rather than woman-identification or even the
sexual act itself (which can obviously occur between women for reasons
unrelated to desire), that specifies lesbian sexuality.
As Laplanche and Pontalis define it in their authoritative Vocabulaire
de la psychanalyse,
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sexuality does not mean only the activities and pleasure which
depend on the functioning of the genital apparatus: it also
embraces a whole range of excitations and activities which may
be observed from infancy onwards and which procure a pleasure
that cannot be adequately explained in terms of the satisfaction
of a basic physiological need (respiration, hunger, excretory
function, etc.).... As opposed to love, desire is directly dependent
on a specific somatic foundation; in contrast to need, it
subordinates satisfaction to conditions in the phantasy world
which strictly determine object-choice and the orientation of
activity. (The Language of Psycho-Analysis, pp. 418 and 421-22)
In other words, desire, not love or need, is specific to sexuality. But then,
what of my title? What do lesbian sexuality and desire have to do with the
practice of love?
The passage I just quoted states that desire is (unlike love) directly
dependent on a somatic or instinctual foundation, but instinctual satisfaction
is (unlike need) dependent on fantasy. It is fantasy that, in turn, strictly
determines object-choice [Objektwahl] and orientation of activity, or
instinctual aim. Objekt, in Freud's sense, is usually a person but could also be
apart of the body or an extension of the person, as in fetishism. In my book I
argue that the object to which the drive attaches itself, the so-called object of
desire, represents a fantasmatic object, an intrapsychic image; in other words,
desire is dependent on a fantasy scenario which is evoked by the object and
from which the object acquires its fantasmatic value, acquires the ability to
represent the fantasmatic object. With the word love (rather than sex) I want
to stress this fantasmatic quality of sexuality and the dependence of lesbian
Sexuality in the Fictions of Theory
de Lauretis 5
desire, specifically, on what is ultimately a demand for love inscribed in a
fantasy of the female body, a fantasy of dispossession (analogous to what
psychoanalysis calls castration, but not the same thing, as I will argue).
Where does such fantasy come from?
In Freudian psychoanalysis, fantasy-conscious and unconscious-is
understood as a psychic process that structures subjectivity: the activity of
fantasy is prompted by the loss of the first object of satisfaction (the mother's
breast and body), and the contents of fantasy are initially shaped by parental
fantasies, both conscious and unconscious. From then on, fantasy acts as a
dynamic grid through which external reality is adapted or reworked in
psychic reality.
It is the subject's life as a whole which is... shaped and ordered by
[the structures of fantasy]. This should not be conceived of
merely as a thematic [but rather as adynamie process] in that the
phantasy structures seek to express themselves, to find a way out
into consciousness and action, and they are constantly drawing
in new material. (The Language 0/ Psycho-Analysis, p. 317)
As the new material includes events and representations occurring in
the external world, one could say that fantasy is the psychic mechanism that
governs the translation of social representations into subjectivity and self-
representation, and thus the adaptation or reworking of public fantasies in
private fantasies. However, the parental fantasies and other sociocultural
representations of the body as sexual are transmitted to the subject not only
through language, but also and especially through practices familial and
institutional which, Laplanche and Foucault concur, "implant" sexuality in
the body as both source and effect of the subject's desire. The word practice in
Sexuality in the Fictions of Theory
de Lauretis 6
my title is meant to emphasize the material, embodied component of desire
as a psychic activity whose effects on the stLbject's bodily ego constitute a sort
of habit or knowledge of the body, what the body "knows"-or better, has
come to know-about its instinctual aims.
In one sense, then, the title The Practice of Love is intended to convey
that lesbian desire is articulated from a fantasy of dispossession or lack of
being through the personal practices that disavow it and resignify the demand
for love. In another sense The Practice of Love means to suggest that both the
sexual and the representational practices of lesbianism can effectively reorient
the drives by providing new somatic and epistemological grounds to fantasy
and desire. A further objective of my work, then, is to consider how practices
may affect or inflect instinctual activity. In the term practices I include both
personal as weIl as interpersonal or social practices-not only what Foucault
has described as practices or "technologies" of the self, but also the practices
issuing from institutions and discourses deployed in what he calls the
"technology of sex," and whose effect is to produce the subject as a sexual
subject according to culturally specified categories such as male or female,
normal or deviant, healthy or pathological, heterosexual or homosexual, and
so forth.
A psycho-analysis is an instance of practice that is at once individual
and interpersonal; a practice of self, on the part of the analysand, but one
whose connection with the socio-institutional technologies of sexuality,
represented by the trained and licensed analyst, is rendered explicit by the
essential function of transference [Übertragung]. In this regard, I analyze two
case histories in which the analyst's theoretical beliefs and interpretive
frames prompt or elicit corresponding fantasmatic productions in the
patients: one is Helene Deutsch's paper "On Female Homosexuality" (1932)
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and the other is Melanie Klein's analysis of "Little Dick" (1930). In both cases,
the analyst's interpretation [Deutung]-which imposes on the patient the
classic, Oedipal, interpretive frame-produces a result, makes something
happen: it releases the patient from the affective block and initiates the
resolution of the psychic conflict.
Klein's "Little Dick" is a 4-your-old boy who can hardly speak and does
not play; he has no interest in toys, seems indifferent to the presence or
absence of his mother, and shows no affects or emotions of any kind. This is
how Klein describes their first session:
I took a big train and put it beside a smaller one and called them
"Daddy train" and "Dick-train." Thereupon he picked up the
train I called "Dick" and made it roll to the window and said
"Station." I explained: "The station is mummy; Dick is going
into mummy."
Klein's verbalization of the Oedipus to her four-year-old patient ("Dick-little
train, Daddy-big train, Dick is going into mummy") apparently allows or
provokes the child to speak for the first time, to form an object-relation
[Objektbeziehung], and to display anxiety-which is an improvement over
his prior impassiveness. The analyst's prompting, as Shoshana Felman
observes in her reading of Klein's case history, "does not function
constatively (as a truth report, with respect to the reality of the situation) but
performatively (as a speech act)" (114); that is to say, it provides, brings about
or implants into "Little Dick" the psychosexual (Oedipal) structure by which
the child will henceforth relate to other human beings.
In Deutsch's case, the patient is a married woman, mother of several
children, who suffers from depression, anxiety and suicidal tendencies.
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Although she was aware of her homosexual feelings, before the analysis she
did not engage in sexual practices even when she fell in love with other
homosexual women. She was afraid that in a lesbian relationship she would
become subjugated to her partner. Deutsch interprets this as a fear of her
aggressive and masochistic attachment to her mother, whose sadistic
punishment of the girl's infantile masturbation was remembered by the
patient during analysis. This memory and the fact that the analyst gave her
consent or authorized her to seek sexual gratification made it possible for the
patient as an adult woman to get rid of the guilt and fear that inhibited her
sexually; she then transferred her sexual feelings from the analyst to other
women and was able to be actively and happily homosexual. (This is indeed a
rare example of successful psychoanalysis). Of course, Deutsch would have
preferred the patient to become heterosexual; so she referred her to a male
analyst, to continue the analysis with a "fatherly figure," but this did not work
for the patient. Eventually, Deutsch concluded that her analysis had been
successful. And so, most probably, did the patient.
It is this performative quality of "interpretation" that makes analytic
practice an effective discourse, a representation of the sexual that has effects,
that effects a structuring of sexuality in the subject; or, as I speculate of
Deutsch's patient, that may contribute to a restucturing, a reconfiguration of
the drives. Both analysts. Deutsch and Klein, deploy one and the same
interpretive frame, the Oedipus complex, which is the enabling fantasy or the
theoretical fiction of psychoanalysis; but the contingent so<;:iosexuallocations
and personal histories of the respective patients cause the latter to rework or
recast that fantasy and produce individual modifications, even, in the case of
Deutsch's patient, in a direction the analyst ·has not intended. Similarly, I
argue, public fantasies as represented in films, for example, or literature, or
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other cultural narratives, may shape or inflect the subjectivity of the
spectator, the reader, the subject in culture.
On the part of the analyst, a psycho-analysis is not dissimilar from a
textual analysis, a kind of reading, in which the analyst's intersubjective
involvement or participation is called by the name of counter-transference
[Gegenübertragung]. This at least in theory; that is to say, this is what Freud
suggests in his papers on technique, in particular the one titled "Analysis
Terminable and Interminable" ["Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse"
(1937)]. In practice, few psychoanalysts are aware of their own fantasies and
how these may affect the direction of the analysis.
2. Reflections on the relation of theory and practices:
a) A theory is a construction in analysis; it comes about from a practice
of reading and a practice of writing.
b) Psycho-analysis is a practice of reading; and the writing of
psychoanalysis, its theory and its case histories, produce the enabling fiction of
the psyche as text.
Now, there is no doubt that Freud's theory of the psyche has
influenced our Eurowestern ways of reading and seeing, as weIl as our
practices of textual criticism and theory (especially in the US, where Freud is
mostly read and taught in literature departments). Let me suggest that, vice
versa, the practice and the theory of psychoanalysis as Freud imagined them
are themselves shaped by literary forms and by the processes of textual
analysis, both literary and visual.
It is hardly necessary to remark on the constant references to literary
works in Freud's; this is self evident. His analogies for the mental apparatus
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have also been noted: at first, in The Interpretation 0/ Dreams [Die
Traumdeutung (1900)], he imagined the mind as a multi-Iayered visual
instrument like the photographie camera or the system of lenses in a
telescope (SE 5: 536-537), and later as a sort of palimpsest or psychographie
apparatus, a Wunderblock (ItA Note Upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad'lt (1924).1
What has also been established, since the structuralist work of Roman
Jakobson in linguistics and poetics, is the formal similarity between the
expressive mechanisms of the dreamwork and the primary figures of poetic
language-the intimate nexus of condensation, displacement, conditions of
representability, and secondary revision [Verdichtung, Verschiebung,
Darsteilbarkeit, sekundäre Bearbeitung] with metaphor, metonymy,
synechdoche, irony, etc.-the tropes or figures that constitute the rhetorical
work of any practice of verbal and visuallanguage, from common speech to
advertising, scientific discourse, film, and so on.
But what has not been sufficiently emphasized is the effect of literary
forms, with their narrative and figural dispositions, on Freud's imagination
of a new entity, the psyche, that is at once a theoretical object and a form of
reality-what he called psychic reality. I suggest that the influence of literary
form, as much as the scientific language of his training and certainly more
than philosophical discourse, to which he was not partial, is responsible for
Freud's conception of psychoanalysis as a practice of reading, of the psyche as
text (in the sense given this term by Roland Barthes), and-Iet me add-of
subjectivity as a kind of writing of self, or better, a writing where self-identity
and meaning are constantly deferred. Two examples will suffice. First:
describing his plans for Die Traumdeutung in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess,
Freud wrote:
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The whole thing is planned on the model of an imaginary walk.
First comes the dark wood of the authorities (who cannot see the
trees), where there is no clear view and it is easy to go astray. Then
there is a cavernous defile through which I lead my readers-my
specimen dream with its peculiarities, its details, its indiscretions
and its bad jokes-and then, all at once, the high ground and the
open prospect and the question: "Which way do you want to go?"
(Letter to Fliess dated August 6, 1899, quoted in [editor's] footnote,
"The Interpretation of Dreams" [SE 4: 122])
The model after which Freud imagines the form and content of his
book is, of course, not just "an imaginary walk," or any imaginary walk: first
comes the dark wood; then the descent into the hell of self-analysis and the
unconscious erupting in the dream of Irma's injection, with its embarrassing
personal details, its indiscretions and bad jokes; and finally (as it were,
through the anus of Lucifer) the attainment of an "open prospect" in view of
the starry sky. These points or stages of a journey map Fre·ud's not innocent
walk onto the geometry of Dante's Divina Commedia. In August 1899, before
his theory of the psychic apparatus has assumed its final, printed and public
existence, it is the journey of self discovery and the teleological, forward-
moving, narrative form of Dante's poem that Freud takes as model.
When, in the 1930s, Djuna Barnes writes her own dark passage
through Nightwood-that celebrated text of literary modernism and now,
also, of literary lesbianism-the form and content of her book, the imaging
and the imagination of the journey, have been irrevocably altered. It is not
only that so-called historical events have changed the objective world, as
dangerously for Freud as for Barnes, making "the high ground" invisible and
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barely conceivable, and instigating instead both Freud's and Barnes's
respective ruminations on the death drive. It is also that a discursive event-
that epic poem of modernity that is The Interpretation of Dreams-has
reinscribed the topos of the journey within an altogether different dark wood,
replacing the teleological/theological narrative with one in which the dark
wood will never be left behind for the high ground: the journey is
henceforth interminable, reversible, discontinuous, and intertextual.
The second example, also from The Interpretation of Dreams, is
obviously Oedipus. Again, what Freud takes from Sophocles is not just the
content of the drama, the originary trauma of sexuality-a trauma that both
marks and precedes the birth of the herD, the birth of each subject. What
Freud takes from Sophocles is also the particular movement of the drama,
both analeptic and proleptic, from present to past to present, as it is inscribed
in the form of the classic tragedy. It is that mode of belated understanding or
retroactive attribution of traumatic meaning to earlier events, which Freud
will call Nachträglichkeit (deferred action or afterwardness), that characterizes
the structure of fantasy and with it Freud's new, modernist understanding of
sexuality.2 No longer the direct result of a single, biological causality or
reproductive instinct, sexuality in Freud is a function of fantasy, memory and
representation. These overdetermine the vicissitudes of the drives
[Triebschicksale] and make of sexuality a process, a structuring of the subject,
an activity of production.
The drive, Freud's most original concept, is a liminal figure, like the
Sphinx: "The concept of instinct [Trieb]," he writes, lies "on the frontier
between the mental and the physical" (SE 7: 168). Like the Sphinx, sitting on
the divide between animal and human, partaking of both, the drives inhabit
a borderland between the somatic and the capacity for representation. That
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borderland is the psyche, a site where the materiality of the body is
represented-written and rewritten-in figures and tropes, the fantasms of
language; an immaterial site, and yet one that presides over the repeated
materializations of the symptom, the bodying forth of mnemic traces in
hallucinations, the ("regressive") perceptions of visual, auditory, tactile,
olfactory sensations in dreams.
The psyche, then, just as Barthes says of the text, "is experienced only in
an activity of production"; it, too, Freud shows, "only exists in the movement
of a discourse" ("From Work to Text," p. 157). And that discourse is
psychoanalysis. A psycho-analysis is a reading of that text, the psyche, with its
polysemy or "stereographic plurality" of meaning, in Barthes's words, its
overdeterminations, in Freud's. However, this polysemy of the text makes
the experience of reading "not a co-existence of meanings but a passage, an
overcrossing" (Barthes, p. 159). Reading is a passage through a dark wood-to
return once more to that useful trope-a wood that is populated with the
ghosts and the voices of other texts. Both psychoanalysis and textual analysis
are intertextual, intersubjective, a passage, an overcrossing. And both are
interminable, for every text, like every dream one analyzes, has its navel, the
point at which it makes "contact with the unknown" (ttThe Interpretation of
Dreams," SE 4: 111).3
It is because the psyche is a text that Freud can say, "The asymptotic
termination of the treatment is substantially a matter of indifference to mett
(Freud, letter to Fliess, April 16, 1900, quoted in SE 23: 215). One would think
that such astatement appears in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable"
(1937), reflecting the late Freud's pessimistic view of the therapeutic
effectivity of psychoanalysis, his loss of confidence in the complete success or
even the possibility of a cure. But the statement actually appears in a letter to
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Fliess written in 1900, the year of publieation of The Interpretation of Dreams,
when Freud was just embarking enthusiastieally in his projeet and had not
yet surmised the existenee of a death drive [Todes triebe] or its role in
undermining the ego and sustaining the resistanee to its therapeutie
alteration, the resistanee to the eure.
But why Freud's seeptieism? He believed that "the interminable
nature of the treatment ... is dependent on the transferenee" and, in a
sueeessful transferenee, it depends on the patient's desire both to be weIl and
to eontinue to be ill. Whenee the indefinite deferral of the eure or what he
ealled "the asymptotie termination of the treatment" (quoted in Editor's Note
to "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," SE 23: 215). But if the treatment
is always meant to terminate, yet it does not, exeept by the analyst's or
patient's contingent deeision; or if the eure is about to be attained, and yet it
never is, is this not beeause the transferenee (and we eould add, the eounter-
transferenee) also exists within the psyche and its aetivity of produetion-a
retroaetive, deferred, eontinuous, interminable produetion of self and
meaning? Is it not beeause transferenee and eountertransferenee only exist
"in the movement of a discourse"?
I will not claim disingenuously that the formal analogy I draw between
the psyche and the text as Barthes defines it is purely eoineidental, for the text
of Barthes resonates intertextually with Freud's as Freud's does with
Sophoeles's or Dante's. This intertextuality is what makes textual analysis
interminable, even as it enables it; and the indefinite deferral of the text's
meaning for the reader, the asymptotie termination of textual analysis, is also
"a matter of indifferenee." The point of reading, after Freud, is not to attain a
eure, a final elosure of meaning, a theologieal epiphany, or a definitive
interpretation, but to engage in an intersubjeetive, intertextual, ongoing series
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of what can best be named, in his words, "constructions in analysis" (SE 23:
255-269 ).4
3. A theory is a passionate fiction
Theory, Freud intimated, is a "construction in analysis." I suggest that
what it constructs is a passionate fiction, a countertransferential fantasy, a
wish-fulfilment: remember Freud's construction of latent homosexuality in
the "Wolf Man"'s primal scene?5 Or his construction of Dora as wanting a
kiss from him? And the unnamed patient of "Psychogenesis of a Case of
Homosexuality in a Woman" who, Freud thinks, really wants her father?
That was Freud's passionate fiction and is the enabling fiction of
psychoanalysis: the scenario of a cross-gender, positive Oedipus complex in
which, just as the boy child desires his young mother, so does the adult man,
becoming father, desire his young daughter's desire for himself.
Another example: faced with a homosexual patient, Helene Deutsch is
proud that her analytic mothering cures the young woman and enables her to
live out her homosexuality as, in her words, a "vivid, radiant person."
Although Deutsch might have preferred a heterosexual resolution of the case,
she can nevertheless gain satisfaction from the clinical confirmation that the
mother is the figure of women's primary attachment, and hence the evidence
of the crucial role of wornen analysts, the vindication of their rightful place in
the psychoanalytic institution-not a small satisfaction in 1932, and indeed a
wish fulfilled.
Today, the fantasy of a maternal power potentially accruing to all
women is outspoken in feminist psychoanalytic theory. And again, this is a
passionate and enabling fiction: the theory that a "homosexual factor" or a
"homosexual-maternal" component is constitutive of all female sexuality,
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owing to the girl child's pre-Oedipal attachment to the mother, constructs a
feminine subject of desire that was unthinkable in classical psychoanalysis
and is impossible in normative heterosexuality. The problem with this
feminist theory, however, is that it both appropriates and denies the sexual
difference of lesbians, the specificity of lesbian desire and its effects on one's
body, one's subjectivity, even one's political subjecthood. Let me elaborate
briefly.
With few exceptions, feminist psychology and psychoanalytic theory
have reclaimed the mother as the primary, if not the only, formative
influence in female psychosexual development, and have postulated that a
"homosexual factor" or a latent homosexuality is part and parcel of female
sexuality from birth on. ,The girl's first love for the mother is subsequently
renounced under the social and/or instinctual pressures of heterosexuality,
this feminist theory maintains; but it remains active, whether conscious or
not, throughout the course of a woman's life, causing a strong tendency
toward bisexuality and a labile, fluid, or oscillating pattern of identifications
and object-choices that make a feminine sexual identity inherently unstable,
fundamentally compromised, even unachievable.
In postulating a latent or potential homosexuality of all women,
however, this feminist theory has been careful not to qualify it as lesbian:
indeed, the phrase "homosexual-maternal" equivocates on the "same-sex
relation" of mother and daughter, because, on the one hand, it intimates
homosexuality, with emphasis on the sexual, even genital, connotations of
the word; but, on the other hand, it may be taken on a purely descriptive or
constative level, since homosexual also means "of the same sex," and hence
the term refers to the "fact" that a daughter has the same sex or the same body
as her mother. (This, incidentally, is not at all a "fact," because the body of
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desire is a fantasmatic body and not an anatomical one). Then there are those
cases in which this "same-sex relation" between women is qualified as
lesbian, as in the phrase "the lesbian continuum" (made famous by the work
of Adrienne Rich); but here the lesbian qualifier is most often de-sexualized,
if not de-eroticized, and metaphorized to mean a continuity of woman-
identified women-who may sleep with each other or not, but that, in this
feminist theory, makes no difference. This is the problem; for I think the
difference is there.
In other words, conceptually, the homosexual-maternal metaphor is a
trope, a fiction, that projects onto female sexuality certain features of an
idealized female sociality-sisterly or woman-identified mutual support,
anti-hierarchical and egalitarian relationships, an ethic of compassion and
connection, an ease with intra-gender affectionate behavior and emotional
sharing, a propensity for mutual identification, and so forth. This is one of
the reasons, I believe, why some lesbians in the United States have
abandoned or outright refused the feminist "homosexual-maternal"
imaginary, even as others have literalized the maternal metaphor with the
help of sperm banks and international adoption. In its place, contemporary
transgender studies and what is called "queer theory" have offered an
alternative fantasy, a non-maternal but equally redemptive and voluntaristic
fiction in which sexualities and genders are indefinitely recombinable and
refashioned through technology or performance.
But the seductiveness of the homosexual-maternal metaphor-the
seduction it both implies and performs-derives from the erotic charge of a
desire for women which is specifically lesbian; which, unlike masculine
heterosexual desire, affirms and enhances the female-sexed subject and
represents her possibility of access to a sexuality autonomous from the male.
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The problem is that, by charting the road of access through the maternal, and
thus displacing the difficult question of women's heterosexual desire,the
homosexual metaphor erases the particular relation between women that is
lesbianism, a relation that is both sexual and sociosymbolic, and that entails
not only a different configuration of desire but also a different production of
reference and meaning, though not always and not necessarily in the terms of
feminism.
4. My own theory as passionate fiction
It was in trying to understand something of that particular relation
between women, lesbianism, that I set out on a journey of reading, of writing,
and of intertextual analysis, guided by fantasy and looking for the figures of
my desire. What I construct in The Practice of Love is not a universal,
aetiological,or developmental theory of lesbian sexuality, but a passionate
fiction which, if you recall Dante's metaphor of the dark wood re-used by
Freud and Djuna Barnes, in a way represents another kind of passage through
the dark wood-in this case, my own. If I call my work a theory and not a
poem, it is because, like Freud's but unlike Barnes's, my fiction does aspire to
formal validity as a model of desire. By model I mean a schematic
representation (such as a graph or verbal description) of the articulation of the
component parts or movements of a mechanism, a psychic mechanism in
this case. Think of Freud's two models of the psychic apparatus, or of the
Oedipus complex as the model of the psychic processes that regulate adult
sexuality, namely, identification and object-choice. I propose instead that
disavowal [Verleugnung], Le. the splitting of the ego [Ich-Spaltung] and not
the Oedipus, is the mechanism that accounts for aperverse or fetishistic
lesbian desire-perverse not in the sense of pathological or immoral, but
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perverse precisely in the sense that it is not Oedipal, or rather, that it has
moved beyond the terms of the Oedipus, mother and father; put another
way, the perverse or fetishistic model articulates desire without recourse to
the permutations of the two sets of binary terms of the Oedipus complex,
mother /father and desire/ identification.
Let me elaborate on what I mean by perverse desire. Freud's writing
on sexuality from the Three Essays [Drie Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie] of
1905 to the posthumous works on fetishism is marked by a consistent
ambiguity, which makes it possible to read two theories of sexuality in his
work: one is explicit and affirmative, a positive theory of "normal" sexuality
that goes from the infantile stage of polymorphous perversity to a successfully
Oedipalized, normal, heterosexual adulthood. The other theory, I contend, is
implicit and negative, appearing as the nether side or clinical underground of
the first: here, as I read it, sexuality consists of two modalities, perversion and
neurosis, depending on the presence and degree of repression. In this theory,
what is called "normal" sexuality is not an innate disposition or
configuration of the sexual instinct, but rather the result of particular
negotiations that a subject manages to achieve between the internal pressures
of the drives, the various component instincts or partial drives, and the
external, parental and societal pressures.
My argument follows from Freud's radical insight that the relation
between the drive [Trieb] and its object is not natural, preordained by
"biology," fixed, or even stable. The sexual drive, he wrote, is "in the first
instance independent of its object" ("Three Essays," SE 7: 147-48). And again:
The object of an instinct is ... what is most variable about an
instinct and is not originally connected with it, but becomes
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assigned to it only in consequence of being peculiarly fitted to
make satisfaction possible. ("Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,"
SE 14: 122)6
In this sense, perversion is not a distortion of "nature," a deviation from a
biologically determined law that assigns one and only one type of object to the
sexual drive, but is rather an inherent way of being of the drive itself, which
continuously seeks out the objects best fitted to its aim of pleasure and
satisfaction. Thus, if the drive is independent of its object, and the object is
variable and chosen for its ability to satisfy, then the concept of perversion
loses its meaning of deviation from nature (and hence loses the common
connotation of pathology) and takes on the meaning of deviation from a
socially constituted norm. This norm is precisely "normal" sexuality, which
psychoanalysis itself, ironically, proves to be nothing more than a projection,
a presumed default, an imaginary mode of being of sexuality that is in fact
contradicted by psychoanalysis's own clinical evidence.
Perversion, on the other hand, is the very mode of being of sexuality as
such, while the projected norm, in so-called normal sexuality, is a
requirement of social reproductioo, both reproduction of the species and
reproduction of the social system. Now, the conflation, the imbrication, of
sexuality with reproduction in Western history has been shown by Foucault
to come about through what he called "the technology of sex" and has been
analyzed by feminist theory in the concept of compulsory heterosexuality.
And it is, obviously, still a widely held or hegemonic notion. Hut my point is
that the specific character of sexuality (as distinct from reproductioo), and the
empirically manifested form of sexuality, as far as psychoanalysis knows it, is
perversion, with its negative or repressed form, neurosis.
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In this especially my work diverges from other feminist and lesbian
studies: they are opposed to theorizing lesbian sexuality in psychoanalytic
terms, and especially contest the notions of castration and the Oedipus
complex. My theory, on the contrary, relies on the Freudian concepts of
fantasy, the unconscious, and deferred action [Nachträglichkeit], and on the
psychic mechanism of disavowal [Verleugnung] as it operates in fetishism;
thus it retains as central the psychic structure of castration, which prompts the
defense of disavowal and the splitting of the ego. This is what my
transferential and countertransferential reading encounters in the lesbian
texts I analyze as a fantasy of bodily dispossession (symbolically equivalent to
what psychoanalysis calls castration). My work also differs in proposing a
model of desire that does not forego or bypass the Oedipus complex but passes
through it, although it goes beyond it and its way resolves it.
I am aware that my use of the terms fetish and castration can be
misread by an impatient reader, to whom I may seem to ignore the feminist
argument that the account Freud gives of sexuality is from the perspective of
a male body-ego. But I do not ignore that argument, which I have myself
made on many occasions; indeed I start from it. In my model, what
psychoanalysis calls castration is redefined in relation to a female body, or in
Freud's term, a body-eg07. Since castration or the threat of bodily
dispossession is experienced fantasmatically, intrapsychically, in relation to a
body-ego that is female-sexed, then castration cannot be feIt by the subject as
the possible loss of a penis, which was never apart of that body. If fantasies
are the "operative link" between the drives and the body-ego, they are, as
Susan Isaacs put it, "primarily about bodily aims, pains and pleasures"; the
fantasy of castration is a threat to one's body-ego, the possible loss of one's
body-ego, and the threat to be disavowed is the threat of non-being. On the
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level of unconscious fantasy, castration is a narcissistic wound to the subject's
body-image that doubles the loss of the mother's body and threatens the
subject with a loss of being, with non-existence. On the symbolic level,
however, the cultural (paternal) prohibition of access to the female body (not
only to the mother's body: incest, but also to one's own body: masturbation,
and to other women's bodies: perversion)-this cultural prohibition rewrites
or explains that sense of loss as a "natural" inferiority of women, a biological
sexual difference-the lack of a penis, and thus an irremediable deficiency.
The sense of lack or dispossession that is acknowledged by many
women, that prompts their identification with the father and is therefore
construed as penis envy or masculinity complex, is the symbolic translation
(into the expressive forms available in our cultures-from common language
to theory to psychoanalytic dialogue, and so on) of what has been at first
perceived as a threat to one's being, one's body-ego; but that perception
remains unconscious, unutterable except through the means of
representation characteristic of primary processes, through symptomatic
expression, or through what I call the signification of the fetish-a sign or
signifier that represents at once the absence of the object and the wish for it.
In sum-I'm about to conclude-there are two related theoretical
objectives in this book. One is the reevaluation of the concept of perversion in
Freud, as distinct from the pathological, and its resignification in what I call
perverse desire, a type of desire fetishistic in a general sense and specifically
homosexual or lesbian. The other is the effort to theorize what Foucault calls
the "implantation of perversion" in the subject, to analyze the mechanisms
social and psychic by which the subject is produced at once as a social and a
sexual subject; and it is so produced through her solicitation by and active
participation in various discourses, representations, and practices of sex. So
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one is not born a woman (to paraphrase Simone de Beauvoir), one is not born
heterosexual or lesbian or whatever, but sexuality and desire are shaped and
overdetermined by a host of sexual-representational practices, parental
fantasies and cultural fictions-and these include what I have called the
fictions of theory.
1 Freud's representation of the psyche as writing, as a play of differance, is
compellingly argued by Derrida (1967).
2 Deferred action [Nachträglichkeit] is first defined in "Project for a Scientific
Psychology" (1895): "a memory arousing an affect which it did not arouse as
an experience, because in the meantime the change [brought about] in puberty
had made possible a different understanding of what was remembered" (SE 1:
356); it is again brought up, unchanged, in the "Wolf Man" case history (SE 17:
45) to aid in the construction of the primal scene and subsequently articulates
the very structure of castration.
3 "The dream's navel [is] the spot where it reaches down into the unknown.
The dream-thoughts to which we are led by interpretation calU1ot, from the
nature of things, have any definite endings; they are bound to branch out in
every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought. It is at
some point where this meshwork is particularly close that the dream-wish
grows up, like a mushroom out of its mycelium" (SE 5: 525).
4 What is usually thought of as Freud's "discovery" of the unconscious,
Shoshana Felman remarks, is actually a theoretical construction: the
unconscious is not discovered but constructed. What he discovered was "a
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new way of reading": reading the hysterical discourse of his patients and his
own unconscious through that discourse. The (psycho)analytic reading is "of
such a nature that it cannot be direct, intuitive; it is constitutively mediated
by a hypothesis; it necessitates a theory. But the reading is not theory: it is
practice, a practical procedure" (pp. 23-24).
5 On the countertransferential and intersubjective character of Freud's
theoretical construction of the primal scene in this case history, see Davis.
6 The Standard Edition translates both Trieb and Instinkt with the same
~
word, instinct. Whenever the word inst~ct(s) appears in this text, it should be
understood as Trieb(e).
7 "A person's own body, and above all its surface, is a place from which both
external and internal perceptions may spring.... The way in which we gain
new knowledge of our organs during painful illnesses is perhaps a model of
the way by which in general we arrive at the idea of our body.... The ego is
first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the
projection of a surface." And in a footnote added to the English translation,
which does not appear in the German editions, Freud writes: "The ego is
ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from
the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as amental projection of the
surface of the body, besides... representing the superficies of the mental
apparatus" ("The Ego and the Id," SE 19: 25-26).
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